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N THE FALL OF 1907 Wilfrid Ward was worried. That September Rome had issued the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, which condemned Modernism as "the synthesis of all heresies." The document had done some synthesizing of its own in order to present Modernism as a coherent system, exposing its philosophical roots and the extent of its reach into multiple areas of Catholic life and thought. What caused Ward no little anxiety was a perception that the encyclical had done its work all too well, casting its net so widely that it seemed to have enmeshed even John Henry Newman. the exemption of this or that Catholic from the papal condemnation, for him "the only thing that could make Pascendi tolerable would be a real, and not merely nominal, demonstration of how the document was in fact compatible with the best and the oldest aspects of Christian life and thought."
3 George Tyrrell's reaction was more aggressive. In the course of two articles in the Times he observed, "When the encyclical tries to show the modernist that he is no Catholic, it mostly succeeds in showing him that he is no scholastic-which he knew." 4 Tyrrell was content to see the net cast widely-the better to discredit the authorities who had woven it. (It was these two articles that got Tyrrell excommunicated.) Alfred Loisy responded to Pascendi with "a feeling of deepest depression," which he communicated to Cardinal Merry del Val at the end of September 1907. Loisy went on to write that in the encyclical he found "not merely a solemn denunciation of opinions which, in essential respects, are not those of the persons to whom they are imputed, but also a personal defamation of them." 5 Of course, Pascendi found its expositors and defenders, but it is apparent from this mere sampling that the Vatican's synthesis did not go uncontested. Moreover, a series of measures directed against theological innovators in the years following the condemnation in a climate of denunciation that came to be known as Integralism, together with the imposition of an oath against Modernism in 1910, indicates that authorities were more than willing to enforce the measures set out in the encyclical.
Hence contestation marks the Modernist period (basically coincident with "La Belle Époque, 1890-1914) and may appropriately serve as a guiding thread through what follows here. This element of contestation is evident in attempts during that period itself to frame the issues and craft appropriate responses. Although the terms under which Modernism was condemned constricted the limits under which Catholic scholars could work, "progressives" continued to grapple with some of the same problems, while taking care to distance themselves from solutions censured as "Modernist." Thus, in the post-Modernist period Modernism and its legacy were far from settled. While "Modernism" remained a contagious stigma, the very diagnosis of the disease could vary, according to the frame of reference of the diagnostician. The third and final section of my article moves from post-Modernism to postmodernism. If the nature of Roman Catholic Modernism was (and, to a degree, still is) contested, all the more so is that of postmodernism. "Many postmodernists would take a dim view of any attempt to 'define' the movement, as such a process, they would claim, is part of the modern agenda." 6 Nonetheless, postmodern perspectives have reframed many of the issues contested between advocates of intellectual and structural renewal at the time of the Modernist crisis and their neo-Scholastic critics. Some appreciation of the postmodern contestation of modernity is necessary for gaining perspective on Modernism and its condemnation 100 years on.
THE CONTESTED DEFINITION OF ROMAN CATHOLIC MODERNISM
For a time, titles assuming the form "The Politics of X" appeared trendy. Even if no longer quite so much in vogue, in Modernism's case the titling would be appropriate. As Gabriel Daly has observed, "Defining Modernism is a political act, in that it commits one, if not to a position, at least to a perspective from which to launch one's investigations." 7 Perspectives can be double-ended, in that they can be viewed from either direction. Thus the act of defining may provide perspective on the definers, reflexively positioning them. The Vatican perspective on Modernism was set forth-at length-in 1907, in the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis. There, Modernism emerges as an orchestrated movement, constituting an assault upon orthodoxy on many fronts. The Modernist appears now as philosopher, then as apologist, elsewhere as historian or critic, other times as reformer or as theologian. The encyclical gathers up these fragments and organizes them into a coherent system that their dispersive presentation conceals, thus revealing Modernism as "the synthesis of all heresies"-a step beyond the errors of Protestantism, teetering on the brink of atheism. With nothing less than the integrity of the Catholic faith at stake, the control measures called for in Pascendi are both elaborate and draconian. Conceived in a climate of fear experienced by defenders of orthodoxy, these countermeasures, augmented by a campaign of denunciation conducted by so-called "integralists," succeeded in creating their own climate of fear that inhibited Catholic scholarly initiatives in a number of theological subdisciplines for decades.
The climate in which the condemnation was issued has been evoked by Maude Petre. She knew well several of the figures identified with the Modernist movement and was herself subject to sanctions as a result of her own involvement. Writing nearly four decades after the issuance of Pascendi, she observed: "We must remember, in fairness to those who were not always fair, that the impact of historical criticism on the traditional teaching of the Church was terrifying; that it seemed a case of saving the very essence of the Christian faith from destruction. Not perhaps, since the startling revelation of Copernicanism, had the shock been greater." 8 The challenges to traditional positions with regard to the Scriptures and to subsequent church history that were posed by historical criticism constituted an important, though hardly the sole, factor in shaping Roman reaction. The title of a study by Canon Bernard Gaudeau, editor of La foi catholique, indicates that not only was the substance of those challenges felt to be so dangerous, but in no small measure their source as well. In substance, the corrosive effects of Modernism were far reaching:
Indeed, the facts demonstrate that the doctrine of Modernism leads logically and fatally, not only to the destruction of the element specific to Catholicism, as opposed to Protestantism (dogmatic infallibility of the Church and of the Pope); not only the destruction of what may be called the generic element of Christianity itself (real divinity of Jesus Christ, biblical inspiration, miracle, and other supernatural realities admitted by primitive and orthodox Protestantism); but the facts demonstrate that the doctrine of Modernism leads logically and fatally to the destruction in humanity of the very conception of a real God, distinct from the world, personal and transcendent, that is, the very foundation of all religious belief, every religious idea, all religious meaning, of all religion.
9
If the destructive potential of Modernism was extensive, its source was close at hand, as Le péril intérieur de l'Église indicated. The walls of the fortress had been breached; the enemy had infiltrated the very ranks of the clergy. 10 A sense of betrayal pervades Pascendi, surfacing at intervals in its portrayal of the character and motivation of Modernists. Their views are called "a delirium," "insanity," and "audacious sacrilege." Modernism is a "monstrosity," and its proponents characterized as guilty of "pride and obstinacy," as having cast off all "sense of modesty," as being the "most pernicious of all adversaries of the Church" because they "lay the axe to the root not the branches" while working from within.
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It is apparent from the encyclical that this sense of betrayal is not motivated by purely intellectual concerns. The Vatican condemnation of Modernism may have been delayed by the events surrounding the separation of church and state in France in 1905. The separation forms part of the context of Pascendi and surfaces in the latter's indictment of Modernist support for autonomy in the political realm isomorphic with advocacy for autonomy in the intellectual realm. On their principles, "The State must, therefore, be separated from the Church, and the Catholic from the citizen" (no. 24)-a position earlier condemned by Pius VI.
While the corrosive effects of historical criticism are not neglected by the encyclical, it finds the most intensely problematic aspects of Modernism to be philosophical. 17 The latter does not distinguish between a methodological atheism adopted by secular religious sciences and a metaphysical atheism. Modernists are enclosed within a philosophical phenomenalism, rendering both science and history atheistic in principle and not merely in practice: "God and all that is divine are utterly excluded" (no. 6). The negative principle of agnosticism finds its complement in a positive principle of vital immanence; the two provide for a naturalistic basis for the religious sense. This sense evolves, and with it evolve the symbolic expressions that derive from it-in short, a third principle of evolutionism that Modernists apply to dogmas. The pernicious results of this matrix of philosophical ideas strike far beyond Christianity: "Here we have an immense structure of sophisms which ruin and wreck all religion" (no. 12).
In moving from the Modernist as philosopher to the Modernist as historian, then as critic, Pascendi sought to clarify the close relationship between historical practice and philosophical theories. Despite the fact that some Modernists involved with historical studies "seem to be deeply anxious not to be taken for philosophers . . . yet the truth is that their history and their criticism are saturated with their philosophy, and that their historico-critical conclusions are the natural outcome of their philosophical principles" (no. 30). More specifically, the principles of agnosticism, vital immanence, and evolution are retrieved and connected with Modernist use of historical criticism. The conclusion: "The philosopher leads the way, the 17 To cite Gaudeau again: "we dared, as early as 1895, to affirm that history and exegesis were for the innovators but masks, and that the basis for their doctrine was the dissolving philosophy of relativism, Kantian in origin" (Gaudeau historian follows, and then in due order come the internal and textual critics" (no. 34).
At the time, orthodox expositors of the encyclical sought to translate the document into plainer language for clergy or laity likely to be puzzled by its technicalities; or, assuming a greater degree of sophistication on the part of readers, expositors sought to explicitate and explore connections made in the long doctrinal section. Neither Pascendi's characterization nor the elaborations of its defenders went uncontested, however. The imputation of a Modernist "system," developed around a defined philosophical core, was strongly rejected by Modernists and their sympathizers.
The most extensive reply to Pascendi came from Italy, in the form of Il programma dei modernisti. Principally the work of Ernesto Buonaiuti, 18 it challenged the encyclical's "assumption that there lies at the root of Modernism a certain philosophical system from which we deduce our critical methods, whether biblical or historical."
19 On the contrary, "So far from our philosophy directing our critical method, it is the critical method that has, of its own accord, forced us to a very tentative and uncertain formulation of various philosophical conclusions, or better still, to a clearer exposition of certain ways of thinking to which Catholic apologetic has never been wholly a stranger." In the pages that followed, the Programma's authors sought to make "evident" the "independence of our criticism in respect to our purely tentative philosophy." 20 "Modernism" as a series of conclusions reached on the basis of critical study of texts, rather than a result of a theoretical apriorism held in common found support in a number of other replies to the Vatican condemnation, most notably in Loisy's Simples réflexions.
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In addition to distancing his use of historical criticism from the philosophical dependencies alleged by the encyclical, and his denouncing the reductive characterization of Modernist motivations it contained, Loisy objected to the overly systematic, indeed rather monolithic, portrait of Modernism that emerged from its pages. Here Loisy was on firmer ground than with his dismissal of philosophy as an important factor in directing his work (his efforts in the philosophy of religion were certainly important to him 22 In Italy, the situation is different, in France also: here and there, one can properly speak of a social Modernism. . . . For some, social Modernism is the most important, the most innovating, the most "scandalous," imposing on Catholic consciousness "a ferment, a tension, the cause of a radical mutation, as pressing and unstoppable as an error on the origin of the Pentateuch or even of the fourth Gospel."
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As Loisy, Boland, and others have affirmed, there are modernisms rather than a Modernism. To the extent that one begins with the encyclical's synthesis, there is a tendency to do less than justice to the diversity and corresponding complexity of Modernism. Also, given Pascendi's stress on the intellectual errors of Modernists, adopting that document's perspective too closely can lead to a marginalization or even exclusion of social Modernism from consideration. Moreover the unremittingly negative portrayal of Modernist intentions represented in the papal condemnation has influenced subsequent, even more recent treatments of the crisis. 24 With time has come a stronger sense that Pascendi is not the starting point for de- fining Modernism but is itself part of the dynamic of its delineation. As a counterpart to the encyclical's "top-down" perspective, recent scholarship tends to take into account perspectives of Modernists themselves, as represented, for example, in their autobiographical writings, or in biographies written by knowledgeable contemporaries. 25 While such accounts cannot be accepted uncritically, they do have the merit of mitigating an overintellectualized, overly simplified, portrait of the Modernist movement.
Pascendi has also had an impact through the reactions it called forth. The tendency to counter the encyclical's stress on a pervasive philosophy that informs Modernist methods and conclusions with claims for the independence of those methods and conclusions from a unitary philosophy has introduced its own distortions. Modernism has been represented largely in terms of the intrusion of historical consciousness into a Catholicism little prepared to assimilate it, a clash between Enlightenment and antiEnlightenment mindsets carried on within Catholicism, generating an internal controversy rather peripheral to the broader cultural and intellectual currents of the time. While the impact of historical criticism on biblical studies, church history, and dogma has justly received great attention at the time of the crisis and since, it has done so to the relative neglect of philosophical issues integral to Modernism that serve to connect it to the intellectual currents of the time. In Stephen Schloesser's succinct summary:
There were many anxieties at stake here, but three especially emerge . . . : (a) the importance of human experience-that is, that human life ought somehow to play a central role in our knowledge accounts of the world; (b) the problem of realityfollowing from the previous, acknowledging that interpreting reality via human experience and concepts entails the realization that such interpreted knowledge will be distorting; hence the problem of reality: a need to show that external reality is not unlike the mind that can know it; (c) the problem of determinism-following on a century of realism and naturalism (and especially Darwin), the felt sense that human beings are without free will, the capacity for choosing one possible future over another, and hence the impossibility of any real novelty in the world. . . .
What is significant about this starting point for a study of Roman Catholic Modernism? Put simply: Roman Catholic concerns were catholic concerns-human concerns, recurrent throughout the centuries, inflected in a particularly modernist/ scientific language proper to the end of the nineteenth century. Even this expanded portrait of Modernism is not yet complete, lacking as it does the political dimension of the crisis. This facet of Modernism has not gone uncontested, with accounts of Modernism confining themselves to the intellectual problems and the controversies they generated, countered by analyses that surface factors internal to both intellectual and social reformist currents that constitute a more intimate joining of the two. From the second of these perspectives, at the basis of both scientific modernity and political modernity is the constitution of a public forum of discussion: "In accordance with evidently different modalities, both scientific modernity and political modernity are based on a new practice of discussion and formation of opinion in and through discussion. All that, which is founded on the freedom of personal judgment, represents a serious breach in the social systems based on authority." 27 While, even with the perspective afforded by the distance of a century, it still remains difficult to approach Modernism with a dispassionate objectivity and to find middle ground between its portrayal in Pascendi and the self-interested characterizations of its partisans, there have emerged at least the broad lines of what an adequate definition of the movement would have to look like.
THE CONTESTED AFTERMATH OF PASCENDI
It is possible to set along a continuum those involved in the larger movement for renewal that led to the condemnation of Modernism: Loisy at the center of a range of tendencies that included Pierre Batiffol, Marie-Joseph Lagrange, and Léonce de Grandmaison among the progressives on the right, 28 nation in the Church's life" would be "at best misleading," 33 it is undeniable that the readiness to use the sanctions mandated by the encyclical, reinforced by the efforts of Catholic integralists, had a markedly chilling effect on Catholic scholarship.
Integralism began as a tendency that assumed organizational form in the Sodalitium Pianum (the Sodality of Pius V), founded in 1909 by Monseigneur Umberto Benigni. Created for the purpose of defending papal directives, it carried out its activities mainly through clandestine operations via a federation of secret societies that included agents throughout Europe. Though its membership was never very numerous, it included several highly placed ecclesiastics, and enjoyed the support of others in sympathy with its antimodernist aims. 34 The secret organization that grew up under the façade of the Sodalitium Pianum carried out its campaign chiefly through the tactic of denunciation of an individual or an organization to ecclesiastical authorities. 35 In the course of the integralist reaction, as the definition of orthodoxy narrowed, the perception of what was considered Modernist correspondingly widened. Thus Modernism expanded from its primarily doctrinal referent to encompass "politico-social Modernism," "sociological Modernism," "literary" and "cultural" Modernism. Adversaries detected even "semiModernism" and affirmed that, although the organized, doctrinal Modernism had been vanquished by Pius X, there remained the Modernist state of mind, modernizers to be dealt with. 36 Hence the portrait of the Modernist painted in Pascendi grew increasingly blurred, the likeness applied to a variety of individuals, publications, and organizations. Benigni's organization was finally suppressed in 1921, but the climate it had helped to create lived on. Biblical exegesis continued to be a highly sensitive area, and Rome continued its surveillance of Lagrange, his disciples, and the École biblique throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. A regime of strict censorship prevailed, preventing several important biblical studies from seeing publication. While exegetes of the progressive school did not protest publicly, their correspondence and personal accounts make clear their firm and constant opposition to the official interpretation of the decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission as well as to the control culture of the Roman Church of their time. 38 Practitioners of other theological subdisciplines likewise had to exercise caution publicly, while chafing at times under Roman restrictions. Divino afflante spiritu (1943) eased matters somewhat for exegetes, but Humani generis (1950) cast theologians in the role of delegates and officials of the Church's magisterium. 39 On the eve of Vatican II, sanctions were still being leveled against Catholic exegetes, amid warnings of a renaissance of Modernism, and reflecting tendencies to minimize Divino afflante spiritu and emphasize Humani generis. 40 Jean Calvet sums up the personal dimension of the condemnation and its aftermath: "If you ever deal with the Modernist crisis, do not forget to tell how much we suffered."
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THE CONTESTED NATURE OF POSTMODERNISM
With the perspective afforded by somewhat more than a half century's interval, Thomas O'Dea reflected that "one gets the uneasy feeling that both sides thought they had the 'metalanguage' for handling the vast complex-Loisy in history, Pius in Scholastic theology, or even commonsense language. With such a complete failure to comprehend the complexity of knowing, it is little wonder that events assumed a tragic cast." 42 Nearly another half century's interval since O'Dea's observation provides additional perspective on what he sees as being at stake here. First, then, what factors or elements in the complex phenomenon that is termed "modernity" separate the outlook of a Loisy from that of a Pius X-a Modernist from a Scholastic? Second, since we now speak of a "postmodernity," what 38 Laplanche, La crise d'origine 304-11. 39 "Linked with this is the notion, especially dear to Pius XII-as in the previous century, to Pius IX-that the theologian's highest task lies in proving the present teachings of the magisterium from the evidence of the ancient sources" (Aidan Nichols If indeed it is more correct to speak of "modernisms" in the plural, this is partly related to the necessity of speaking of "modernities."
43 Nonetheless, it is possible to identify "the central concern of [modernity's] originating moment" as "emancipation from late medievalism's heavy reliance on the authority of tradition." Its replacement: "the accountability of a shared intellectual inquiry." 44 One of modernity's salient characteristics is a sense of the historical distance-hence historical difference-separating the present from the past. Put negatively, the sense of continuity with the past had eroded, 45 to the point where the retrieval of the past by an observer far removed from those events both temporally and culturally became problematic, especially as critical studies questioned the authenticity of historical texts, their conditions of production, and the conditions necessary for obtaining verifiable knowledge of the past on the basis of such texts. The key to unlock multiple pasts was thought to be provided by historical critical method. "Historical criticism in the Enlightenment tradition relies on rational, scientific investigation to reveal the content of scripture. In its ideal form, this tradition believes that it is able to go beyond the reach of cultural presuppositions and philosophical commitments to establish the historical meaning of biblical texts once and for all." 46 This opened a gap not only between biblical text and fin-de-siècle interpreter but also between earlier exegetes and modern biblical scholars. Authority was transferred from the former to the community of specialists able to proceed from the "assured results of criticism."
This rather selective and somewhat abstract portrait is consistent with the apologia for Catholic Modernists presented in Il programma dei mod- 43 As John Thornhill has observed, "The central problem of modernity begins to emerge as soon as we seek to define it. In fact, modernity has no firm selfunderstanding or confident self-definition. In its origins it was a movement of reaction against the cultural assumptions of medievalism" (John Thornhill, ernisti-itself representative of a broader consensus among innovators. 47 Its constellation of commitments reflective of modernity placed Modernist biblical and historical scholarship in conflict with the theology dominant in Catholicism.
Another salient characteristic of modernity that proved contentious at the time of the Modernist crisis was a "turn to the subject"-modernity's "awareness of and exploration of the subjective dimension of human experience." 48 Its consequences for human knowing were explored more by the philosophically minded than by exegetes and historians. In 1896, for example, Maurice Blondel could write: "We are faced with a permanent and profound transformation within the constitution of philosophy as a whole, and my desire is to show why this must produce both a religious development for philosophical thought in its entirety and a human development for the religious consciousness and for the very understanding of Christianity." 49 The "profound transformation" in philosophy Blondel was referring to occurred with the philosophy of Kant and the attempts to come to terms with the problems he raised. Despite the efforts of Kant's successors to resolve the problems he bequeathed, Blondel judged these unsuccessful. Essentially, the problem was viewed as coming to terms with the subjective side of human knowing without relinquishing objective truth. NeoThomism's distrust of subjectivity informed its approach to apologetics and so blunted the force of its arguments, which prompted Blondel to state:
Since the thomist starts from principles which, for the most part, are disputed in our time; since he does not offer the means of restoring them by his method; since he presupposes a host of assertions which are just those which are nowadays called in question; since he cannot provide, in his system, for the new requirements of minds 47 Prior to Pascendi, Loisy's clearest exposition of his exegetical approach appeared in a chapter he added to later editions of L'Évangile et l'Église on the sources of the Gospels, and the first two sections of his Autour d'un petit livre (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1903). In the latter volume Loisy reiterates the parallels between natural science and exegetical science (9-10, 35-36). Both deal with hypotheses subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by the data. In both cases the practitioner is an "impartial observer" (57). A scientific exegesis is therefore to be distinguished from "theological and pastoral exegesis" (50-51) by its autonomy, its independence from any theological a priori (49-50, 57). Exegetical science has its terrain, not to be confused with that of church doctrine (65) . 48 which must be approached on their own ground, one must not tend to treat this triumphant exposition as the last word. . . . We must not exhaust ourselves refurbishing old arguments and presenting an object for acceptance while the subject is not disposed to listen.
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In short, Blondel argued that the contemporary situation had produced difficulties that the traditional methods did not address; the classical authors had not envisioned the necessity of preparing minds to receive objective proofs. New times demanded new approaches. Blondel's strategy of beginning with modern thought was perceived in some Catholic quarters to represent a capitulation to modern thought, even if that was not Blondel's intention. The "Lettre" of 1896 unleashed a series of controversies that centered on Blondel, but were not limited to him or his work.
51
Modernity's-and Modernism's-commitments to the historicity and subjectivity of thought came up against the speculative outlook, deductive method, and objective notion of religious truth embraced by neo-Thomism. This system has been described as a "supernatural rationalism"-supernatural in that it derived its data from supernatural revelation, not from autonomous reason; rationalist in its marginalization of experience as a valid theological category. Neo-Thomism has also been characterized as "positivist," in that its sources, scriptural texts, and magisterial documents were objective givens whose meaning required a minimum of interpretation on the part of the believer. By definition, the interpretive element was subjective, and therefore open to error. "The would-be believer . . . brought nothing of his own to the process beyond the tabula rasa so conveniently underwritten by Aristotelian epistemology." 52 The objectivity of this system reduced the role of the historian to one of simple communicator of magisterial pronouncements.
From the preceding, it is possible to position the dominant theology, reflected in Pascendi, as regarding the retrieval of historical meaning as relatively unproblematic for the mind elevated by grace or even the sincere person of goodwill. The consciousness of the historical distance between historical text and present-day interpreter raised by modernity rendered historical meaning more difficult to access. Recourse to the critical methods of modern scholarship was necessary to gain a reliable interpretation of the historical text. This appreciation of historicity represents an advance 50 Ibid. 28, 146 respectively (italics original). over the largely ahistorical proceedings of neo-Thomism, in that the historical relativity of language and concepts must be taken into account, along with the originary context of a given text. This notion of "relative truth" made little sense to a neo-Thomist like Cardinal Louis Billot, who regarded this combination of words as essentially meaningless. 53 However, while the relativity of history was admitted in Modernist interpretation, in the main the relativity introduced by the context of the interpreter was not.
54 Indeed, this tendency was the case for 19th-century historicism more largely: "for much of the century the great thinkers of the nineteenthcentury did not follow through on the most challenging of the implications of historicism," manifesting "an almost inexplicable failure to apply the full impact of historicism to the situation of contemporary knowers."
55 The "crisis of historicism" brings us to consideration of postmodernism, and the second of the questions raised at the outset of this section.
Any attempt to pin down postmodernism makes defining Modernism look comparatively easy. Since the very term "postmodernism" may suggest "a misleading sense of a school or theoretical movement," Paul Lakeland prefers the term "postmodernity."
56 Others are content with the "ism" but configure it differently. Broadly conceived, postmodernism may be configured by its opposition to Enlightenment norms championed by modernity. The site and degree of such opposition give rise to varieties of postmodernism, or, where a greater degree of commitment to modernity is retained, "radical modernism" (Charles Lemert 57 ) or "late modernism" (Lakeland). This diversity suggests that the postmodern condition may, for present purposes, be treated mainly through its effects, rather than by attempting to define its contours. A common thread running through accounts of postmodernism is a concern with the world in front of the text, or the horizon of the interpreter. This concern and some of its principal In this regard Loisy may reveal something of the differences that obtained within the Modernist movement, broadly conceived, as well as limitations in their forms of posing and addressing the issues. Loisy has been judged more successful in revealing Lessing's "great ugly ditch" of history than in resolving the problems it raised. Nonetheless, his work does represent an advance over the progressives, who did not succeed in posing the hermeneutical question in viable form. Pierre Batiffol, representing progressives on the right more generally, hoped to distinguish in orthodoxy an essential, static element, and an element clarified by ecclesial reflection.
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This distinction could not be identified a priori, but by applied research on the part of positive theology, a domesticated historical criticism, so to speak. While the second element has a history, the permanent element does not. Unlike Batiffol, for whom the practice of criticism would reveal an essential, permanent element in dogma distinguishable from the historical forms dogma had assumed, for Loisy the scientific work of the past had introduced a schism between the ancient religious universe and modern historical consciousness. The latter has the effect of dissolving the essential element rather than bringing it more clearly into focus. For Loisy, "The efforts of a healthy theology should be directed to a solution of the antinomy, presented by the unquestionable authority faith demands for dogma and the variability, the relativity, the critic cannot fail to perceive in the history of dogmas and dogmatic formulas."
59 This relativity reveals a distance between the horizon of the interpreter and that of the historical object. However, further advance in coming to terms with the problem would necessitate greater awareness of the relativity imposed by the horizon of the interpreter. "Loisy highlights the historical relativity and the finitude of the religious phenomenon. He veils those in the historian's own work."
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In 1968, the same year in which O'Dea's book appeared, Edward Schillebeeckx published a series of lectures given the previous year. Earlier, at the time of the council, in an essay entitled "The Concept of 'Truth,'" he had acknowledged that "the Modernists did discover a real problem-that of the distinction between truth in itself and truth as a spiritual possession 58 In addition to Rivière's biographical study, referenced earlier, see also of man" but had failed to resolve it in a manner that preserved orthodoxy. In the remainder of the essay he surveyed attempts by the Nouvelle théolo-gie and the Bultmannians to address the issues, acknowledging that the "problem that Modernism was unable to solve-that is, the problem of the relationship between experience and concept-has continued to be a theological issue until today." 61 In God the Future of Man (1968) the initial essay bore the title, "Toward a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics" and drew transparently on the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The sense of the inadequacy of the progressive distinction between "dogmatic essence" and historical mode of expression reappears with Schillebeeckx. 62 The necessity of an "impartial observer," however, does not show up: "What is thematically new in modern hermeneutics is our having come to realize that this openness [to the deviation of the text from the interpreter's own views and expectations] is made possible not by our adopting a neutral attitude and putting aside our own background in brackets in an effort to exclude it, but only by doing the direct opposite-quite consciously admitting the light that we can throw on the text in question from our own contemporary situation." 63 This entails an understanding of history that departs from the one that permeates the pages of Il programma dei modernisti and Loisy's voluminous corpus of writings. "Historical objectivity is the truth of the past in the light of the present and not a reconstruction of the past in its unrepeatable factuality."
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Further reflection on the social situatedness of the present-day interpreter, as well as the successive interpreters that constitute a tradition, led Schillebeeckx to incorporate insights from critical theory into his theology of development. If the interpreter's prejudgments are subject to interpellation by the texts of the tradition, those texts are themselves subject to question on the basis of possible ideological distortions the tradition may incorporate. This awareness, present in postmodern feminist and ideological biblical criticism, 65 is prominent in Schillebeeckx's 1974 study, The Understanding of Faith. Applying critical theory to theological hermeneutics, he observes that it becomes possible to take into account not only "the breakdowns in historical communication between men from case to case," but also to give "a central place in its investigations to the analysis of the significance and the compelling logic of such breakdowns. [Critical
SIMPLIFIED CONCLUSION
After the multiple complexities of Modernism, modernity, and postmodernity, I conclude with some simplified observations. While it would be excessive to characterize neo-Thomist theologians as having the answersto questions no one was asking-the statement is not pure caricature. Modernists had the courage to ask hard questions, posed, however, on modernity's terms and-often-on modernity's turf. It can fairly be said that, in imposing renewed commitment to Scholasticism as solution, Pascendi signally misdiagnosed the problem. It can also justly be said that Modernist assertions regarding the independence of critical methods from philosophical commitments cannot be sustained. If Pascendi manifests difficulty in adequately sorting out methodological from metaphysical commitments, it was right to see them as interconnected. It was also correct in seeing the kinds of philosophical issues raised by Schloesser as integral to Modernism.
Both Pascendi and Modernism have had to give ground on their understandings of science. If theology, understood as an Aristotelian science of faith, failed to resonate with Modernists, an understanding of science conceived on the hypothetico-deductive model of positivism has been challenged by more recent developments in hermeneutics. By extension, the respective approaches to history by both neo-Scholasticism and Modernism have had to be rethought. 71 And the framers of the encyclical would have been shocked at the decline of neo-Thomism in the wake of Vatican II.
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One may note a resurgence in the work of the Modernists around the time of Vatican II-no coincidence that. In a 1918 letter to Maude Petre, Friedrich von Hügel had distinguished "two, really (in substance) distinct, subject-matters which could be described under the term 'Modernism'-especially if we mean Catholic 'Modernism.'" In one sense "Modernism" referred to the historical movement for Catholic renewal condemned unbroader tradition" (7 72 Nicholas Lobkowicz has suggested a number of factors to account for Thomism's decline. He observes that philosophies "do not disappear, or very rarely do so, because someone has succeeded in showing that they are false." Rather, it is more a matter of the more recent one "casting our experience in terms of a conceptual framework that seems more natural to . . . contemporaries" and thus being "considered more relevant, to correspond more closely to the way we experience and interpret reality" der that name in 1907. The other "Modernism" he described as "a permanent, never quite finished, always sooner or later, more or less, rebeginning set of attempts to express the old Faith and its permanent truths and helps-to interpret it according to what appears the best and the most abiding elements in the philosophy and scholarship of the later and latest times. Such work never ceases for long." 73 While it was certainly possible to draw a distinction between the fin de siècle movement and later efforts to engage modernity, the question of the relation between the two naturally occurred at the time of the council. In the summer of 1965, prior to Vatican II's fourth session, Continuum devoted an issue to Modernism seen refracted through some of its prominent representatives and the integralist reaction. Rosemary Ruether's contribution, centering on the work of Alfred Loisy, differentiated between the earlier movement and the contemporary aggiornamento in terms of their respective focal concerns-the former concentrating on historical scholarship, the latter stressing liturgical renewal and ecumenism. She observed:
Keeping these differences in view, however, it is not inaccurate to say that aggiornamento is a movement in the Church in terms of the intellectual conditions of the sixties to do what Modernism tried to do in terms of the Catholicism of the turn of the century. It should not surprise us that the accusation of "Modernism" springs not infrequently to the lips of conservatives in the Vatican Council who would wish to block the progress of the new movement. Yet, in spite of the fact that aggiornamento arises out of the same need and is trying to do much of the same thing, no advocate of aggiornamento would dream of appealing to Modernism, any more than a Modernist would have dreamed of appealing to Döllinger, for the same reason. Any relation to Modernism, once condemned, is a liability. Consequently advocates of aggiornamento strive to exhibit discontinuity between their aims and ideals and those of Modernism and to disavow it in advance. 74 In the council's wake that climate would change, and Catholic Modernism and Modernists would reappear in Catholic scholarship, in part, because they had asked some of the same questions that had emerged over the course of the council's four sessions. Nonetheless, even where the questions themselves had changed (it was no longer a matter, for example, of asking what of history there is in the Bible; rather, how may the Bible be situated in history?) there were enduring underlying issues. One possible way to frame the problem that lies at the basis of the Modernist crisis is "how to conceive the presence and exercise of a spiritual power in a pluralist society?" 75 And, by extension, how to shape a lived response to the application of that power by an ecclesiastical institution? Modernists found promising resources for thinking about both.
In its attempts to come to terms with modernity (von Hügel's second sense of "Modernism"), Vatican II placed Catholicism in a post-Modernist (von Hügel's first meaning of the term) mode. The dropping of the oath against Modernism, originally imposed in 1910, is symptomatic of the change. If efforts at renewal were to attract censure, they would have to be stigmatized on other grounds. However, as Rush points out, "Ironically, just as Roman Catholicism was receiving the elements of modernity judged to be consonant with the Gospel, Western society was entering the yet-tobe-named epoch of what is still vaguely called 'post-modernity.'" 76 The frameworks for meaning have not stood still. Depending on what stance is taken toward "postmodernity," the perspective on Modernism can be expected to vary. 77 If one accepts, for example, the account of the shifts in horizon from modernity to postmodernity suggested in the foregoing, the Modernists represent an advance in the trajectory of 20th-century theology, both within and beyond Catholicism. Still, one may ask, are they memorable in their own right, and not only as a way station to something else? Certainly they had the courage to ask the hard questions, even if they did not always possess resources to answer them adequately. That is worth remembering-and honoring. Moreover, they had the persistence to keep asking the questions and offering solutions, even in face of official indifference, discouragement, and growing hostility. They personalize the dilemma of the scholar (indeed, of the Catholic) who finds the conclusions 75 Colin, L'audace et le soupçon 269. 76 Rush, Still Interpreting Vatican II 20. 77 Lakeland distinguishes among postmodernists (the committed), late modernists (the selectively committed, while still retaining important elements of modernity), and the nostalgic. The radical historicist perspective of a committed postmodernism would make it difficult for Christian theologians to enlist among its ranks. Late modernists would seek to retain commitments to reason and subjectivity, while recognizing that post-Enlightenment developments have enormously complicated their maintenance. The nostalgic response is one of resistance to postmodernity's claims, exemplified in adherents of Radical Orthodoxy. As representative of the latter is Tracey Rowland's assessment: "The conclusion of a number of contemporary scholars is that the response demanded but not met by the Modernist crisis, which included the question of the stance of the magisterium towards the Liberal tradition, but was much more complex and broader in its ambit than this, was the elaboration of a theology of culture." In her estimation Vatican II fell short of providing such, because "the Conciliar fathers generally lacked a notion of modernity as a specific cultural formation" (Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Tho- that emerge from experience at variance with the dicta of ecclesiastical authorities. When fidelity to one's own integrity and fidelity to one's religious tradition conflict, what is to be done? The figures who are remembered for their roles in the Modernist crisis do not present an algorithmic solution so much as a series of exempla, each with its own cost. If indeed, as Newman demonstrated in the Apologia, truth at times is better demonstrated through narrating a life than through "paper logic," then these lives are worth revisiting by those who seek their own integrity in the midst of a church still marked by contested frames of meaning.
